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et al.: Book Review

Book Review
HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE. By Julius Stone. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 1965. Pp. xxiii, 415. $10.00.
In 1946 Professor Julius Stone published The Province and Function of Law.

The author's objective was to examine and critique three broad areas: the
analytics of legal reasoning, the dimensions and meaning of justice, and finally,
the various endeavors that have been made to use the social sciences within the
legal framework so as to achieve justice in a modem democratic society. The
Province and Function of Law received warm critical acclaim; Roscoe Pound
called it "an outstanding contribution to the science of law."' However, since then
the author has, because of what he considers "the vast proliferation of scholarship
in each of the three areas," 2 ambitiously undertaken to expand upon his original
treatise by publishing separate works covering each area. The first book of the
trilogy, Legal System and Lawyer's Reasoning, which appeared in 1964, is an ex-

tremely readable and scholarly treatment of the classical and contemporary use
of reason and logic in developing legal systems. And since there is a definite nexus
between the first and second books of the trilogy, it is perhaps advisable to first
briefly summarize Legal System and Lawyer's Reasoning.

Focusing mainly on John Austin's strict commitment to a legal order in which
positive law flows down to the citizens from sovereign commands and is enforced
by "sanctions," on Hans Kelsen's classification of hierarchial norms, and concluding with Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's comparatively less theoretical system of
eight basic legal conceptions, Stone developed a discernible thread of intellectual
continuity that connected each generation's efforts at constructing logically consistent legal systems. While fully accepting the necessity for endeavors, both by
the practitioner and the scholar, to abstract law from the concrete and to use
logic as a foundation for definition, he emphasized the fallacy of ignoring the impact of the environment in which the legal system must function. And it is in
this particular area of thought that Stone has made a meaningful contribution.
Through the use of what he labeled categories of illusory reference, Professor
Stone developed a set of principles designed to reconcile the seemingly deterministic and immutable application of stare decisis with the dynamics of social, economic, and political changes. Of course the notion of mechanical jurisprudence has
been sharply questioned by countless others. But by demonstrating how his categories of reference "serve as devices permitting a secret and even unconscious exer1. Pound, Book Review, 61 HAv. L. REv. 724 (1948).
2. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAwYmR's REASONING 1 (1964).
(323)
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cise by courts of what in the ultimate analysis is a creative choice" 3 he has added
a new and imaginative perspective to prior scholarship. This attitude is, of course,
a denial of automatic syllogistic decision-making in favor of a flexible and fertile
method that has the capacity to reach equitable solutions within an established
framework. Yet any creative and viable legal system must, in the final analysis,
depend upon transcending values and external guidelines against which the fairness of the resolution of individual conflicts should be measured. These higher
values-which traditionally have been grouped under the word "justice"-constitute the subject matter of the second book of the trilogy.
In Human Law and Human Justice Professor Stone readily acknowledges, as
of course he must, that the term "justice" is an extremely amorphous concept
with endless semantical, philosophical, ethical, etc., twists. It is also a concept
that does not engender consensus; as a matter of fact, the search for its meaning
has occasionally precipitated warfare. Yet even accepting these conflicts, it is
also true that there are established theories of or about justice that, because of
their intellectual fiber, generally dominate any thorough discussion on the subject. All of these established theories appear in Human Law and Human Justice.
The author's technique is to scrutinize and interpret analytically all of the significant concepts of justice in terms of their origins, their influence on their generations, and finally their compatibility with his own notions. The book culminates
with Stone's own theories on the meaning and implications of justice.
By beginning his inquiry with an examination of the impact of Western culture on notions of justice (with emphasis on Hebraism and Hellenism) Stone is
immediately confronted with the imponderables of natural law. Although its influence has, over a long history of violent conflict, been temporarily diluted with
concepts such as ultilitarianism (discussed in Chapter 4), pragmatism (discussed
in Chapter 9), and other theoretical inroads of varying persuasiveness, it has nevertheless had a virile effect on all efforts to give some definitive form to the notion of justice. There seems to be universal agreement that natural law "sees the
individual as held within a framework of binding norms not of human creations." 4
But beyond this point there is very little harmony of thought. Some of this conflict is due to the abstract quality of natural law. Thus the identical theory of
natural law can be used with what Stone calls a "double edged" effect to both
support and attack a single system of justice set up under a governing body. An
interesting example was the use by the opponents of the Catholic Church of the
very same natural law arguments that Thomas Aquinas had advanced to support
that institution. This is, of course, only one of the polemics residing in natural law.
Stone examines each one-always endeavoring to demonstrate either the theory's
appropriateness or its incompatibility with what he considers the realities of justice.
However, Stone is no abstract legal theoretician. Much of the book is spent
in discovering and studying the consequences of the merger of seemingly esoteric
theories of natural law and justice with the pragmatics of government. This has
3. Id. at 241.
4. STONE, HUMAN LAW

AND

HUMAN JusTicE 31 (1965).
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particular relevance to the United States where the drafters of our Declaration of
Independence obviously drew from natural law sources in expressing the beliefs
that all men are created equal, endowed with certain inalienable rights, such as
the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Certainly we, as a nation,
have experienced a certain amount of difficulty in translating these ideals into
conduct. Perhaps the basic explanation is that it is easier to agree on broad principles than it is to come to agreement on the specifics of actual application. Moreover, as the author points out, there has been anything but accord on other important facets of the problem. Assuming the existence of broad principles, such
as the right to the pursuit of happiness, do they apply similarly and equally for
all ages and to all citizens and in all circumstances? How are the specifics of these
universals revealed to man? For example, the Supreme Court, through the word
"liberty" in the fifth and fourteenth amendments' due process clauses, at one time
gave natural law status to common law rights such as freedom of contract and
the protection of property rights and then proceeded to strike down social and
labor legislation that conflicted with these "rights." Yet later, when the mood of
the nation changed, these same "rights" receded into the history of overruled decisions, to be replaced by other institutions invoking the same authority as their
predecessors.
In investigating the eternal struggle for supremacy between positive and
natural law Professor Stone unintentionally illuminates the recent particularist
interest of courts in arriving at what might be called "equitable" or "just" results.
Actually what seems to be occurring is the adoption of the equity technique of
"doing justice," or looking to a higher set of principles against which the litigants
conduct must be measured. The natural law influence is obvious. This is confirmed
by the fact that English equity accepted the conclusion of natural law proponents
that in a confrontation between it and positive law, the latter must fall. The
author notes that "Equity showed for centuries a 'magisterial' censorship of a
natural law kind, by ad koc alleviation of the rigour and formalism of the common
law." 6 It is thus not surprising to note that the Uniform Commercial Code has absorbed a natural law form of equity by providing that a court may refuse to enforce a contract if it, "as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made ...

."

Hence all

positive agreements would be subject to a higher form of justice. Of course, as
with all phrases having natural law content, the essential problem lies in giving
concrete expression to the word "unconscionable."
This persistent clash between natural and positive law has additional contemporary implications of serious import. Much of the justification advanced by
some of the civil rights groups in purposely defying those statutes that they feel
are inimical to their cause has been premised upon the existence of transcending
moral principles that prevail over and abrogate these statutes. The groups that
have embraced this line of thinking have apparently adopted Radbruck's philosophy
S. Id. at 77.
6. U.C.C. § 2-302.
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that when moral rights are in conflict with unjust positive law "the positive law
must give way to justice, not merely in the sense that the positive law is to be
regarded as unjust, and not morally compelling, but also in the sense that it is
not . . . even legally compelling." 7 Such a philosophy is attractive. It would perhaps encourage reaction against tyranny. But it likewise poses formidable problems. For example, what is justice? Human Law and Human Justice lucidly discloses that there is no infallible answer to this question. And more pragmatically,
who determines which laws are just, and therefore should be obeyed, and which
laws are not morally or legally binding?
In the final chapter Professor Stone gives a sense of unity to the book
through a scholarly effort to supply a realistic framework within which to deal
with the ideal of justice. His concern in ten of the eleven chapters with critiquing
the more prominent theories on justice and with the fragile quality of any condusions on the subject is prefatory to a statement of his own views. Preferring
not to confine himself to the permanence of inflexible doctrine and limiting the
application of his views to our generation Stone offers nine guidelines or "material
precepts of justice which we regard as indubitable for our generation of men and
in this sense quasi-absolutes." s Whether one agrees with the content of his "quasiabsolutes," and there is much to recommend them, it is clear that Human Law and
Human Justice is an important document for everyone concerned with the very
delicate balance between the reality of our legal system and man's aspirations.
ARTHUR D. Ausun*

7. SToNE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JusTICE 249 (1965).
8. Id. at 341.
*Assistant Professor, Bowling Green State University; B.S., University of
Virginia, 1958; LL.B., Tulane University, 1963; Member of the Virginia Bar.
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